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Russia’s war against Georgia of August 2008 marks a watershed in international 
politics.  This war’s visible consequences for Europe, Turkey, Russia, and the United 
States are well known and have been discussed extensively in the press.  But the war’s 
relationship to Russian domestic politics is not well understood.  That understanding 
involves more than the obvious, though important, point that the war has reconfirmed 
Vladimir Putin’s primacy above that of his supposed successor as President of Russia, 
Dmitri Medvedev. After all, every war originates not only in an international context, but 
also within a domestic context.
Yet few analysts have grasped the significant connection between this war and the 
apparently unresolved succession struggle in Moscow, nor have they bothered to relate 
civil-military relations in Russia to larger issues of the nature of the state. (1) 
Nonetheless, this and previous Russian wars clearly show that those relations are 
strained, and further, that this tension has the utmost significance for Russian politics.  
Indeed, these two issues, succession and civil-military relations, are inextricably linked 
together in this war.   If we view this war in the context of the struggle over succession 
(and the attendant control over resources, power, and policy), then it becomes clear that 
this succession process represents only the latest confirmation of the fact that the 
Russian state remains chronically vulnerable to internal coups by politicians using force, 
or the threat thereof, during succession struggles.  Indeed, in every succession struggle 
since 1991 we have seen the use (or threat of the use) of force, including during the 
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elections of 1996 and the crisis of 1998, when Boris Yeltsin contemplated force, but was 
successfully dissuaded from employing it. (2)
The key point here is that this war represents the fourth major military action undertaken 
by Russian forces since 1991 (Chechnya twice and Kosovo in 1999).   In all cases, 
including Georgia, Russia’s failure to institute genuine democratic reforms of the civil-
military relationship has created a situation where an inherent temptation towards 
military adventurism, regardless of the ensuing costs, is apparent within the state 
structure.  Force has been used to solve both domestic problems and to threaten 
“enemies” abroad, mainly in order to consolidate the primacy of the ruling elite. Once 
again, Russian ministers thought that a small victorious war against foreigners could be 
waged to secure their power at home and abroad at little or no cost, and once again, 
they miscalculated what would happen. 
Moreover, in this war, as in Chechnya, it is clear that military commanders wanted to go 
further than did the political leadership.  Thus, they may have acted on their own to 
subvert agreements between Russia and the EU, suggesting significant difficulties in 
restraining them. (3) This difficulty in restraining the military, coupled with its unreformed 
and viscerally anti-Western threat assessment and the inherent vulnerability of the 
system, presents an immense potential threat to all of Russia’s interlocutors.  Putin in 
2007 and Medvedev more recently (specifically in conjunction with the threat of nuclear 
retaliation against Poland), have indicated that they have accepted the military’s threat 
assessment of an abiding presupposition of hostility between the West and Russia. It 
then follows that this constant threat must be countered by force. (4)  Moreover, as 
Pavel Felgengauer has observed, these military agencies and their intelligence 
organizations are notorious for distorting evidence to come up with fabricated worst-
case threat scenarios as they did under Soviet leaders. (5)  Therefore, we in the West 
should understand that we live now under constant threat, because Russian leaders are 
disposed towards the use of force in response to deliberately manufactured scenarios of 
constant ideological, information, and political, if not military, aggression emanating 
(allegedly) from the West. (6)
2
The domestic result, an explosion of chauvinistic breast-beating about Russia’s return to 
great power status under conditions where “nobody loves us” (Nas ne lyubyat) is clearly 
part of the ideological rearmament of Russia that Putin has launched since 2004 (if not 
earlier), in order to end once and for all the idea of reform. Thus, Vladimir Shlapentokh 
has shown that an essential component of the Kremlin’s ideological campaign to 
maintain the Putin regime in power and extend it (albeit under new leadership) past the 
elections of 2008 is anti-Americanism.  As he wrote,
"The core of the Kremlin’s ideological strategy is to convince the public that any 
revolution in Russia will be sponsored by the United States.  Putin is presented as a 
bulwark of Russian patriotism, as the single leader able to confront America’s 
intervention in Russian domestic life and protect what is left of the imperial heritage.  
This propaganda is addressed mostly to the elites (particularly elites in the military and 
FSB) who sizzle with hatred and envy of America." (7)
Similarly, the Russian philosopher Sergei Gavrov writes,
"The threats are utopian, the probability of their implementation is negligible, but their 
emergence is a sign.  This sign – a message to 'the city and the world' – surely lends 
itself to decoding and interpretation: we will defend from Western claims our ancient 
right to use our imperial (authoritarian and totalitarian) domestic socio-cultural traditions 
within which power does not exist to serve people but people exist to serve power." (8)
The war against Georgia was both a culmination of previous efforts and the first step in 
a new campaign of this ideological rearmament of Russia as an autarchic, autocratic, 
“sovereign” power that answers to nobody either at home or abroad and is surrounded 
by enemies.
Putin’s Primacy and the Evisceration of Reform
Apart from the enshrinement of a condition of permanent threat and the predisposition 
to adventurism, the other domestic context of this invasion is the extension of Putin’s 
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primacy.  Even if we concede that the war’s motives and origins lie largely in the realm 
of geopolitical considerations, it is clear that it has served to extend Putin’s leadership.  
Indeed, he was even seen on Russian TV giving Medvedev directions at one point 
during the war.  We do not need to argue that the crisis and war were fomented to 
achieve this aim, but they certainly played a role in stopping nascent policies of 
Medvedev’s that appeared to run counter to those of Putin and his entourage, 
particularly his gray eminence, Igor Sechin.  Thus, this war can be seen as only the 
latest example of the linkage between succession crises and the use of force.
Although Russia sidestepped a visible crisis before its presidential elections in early 
2008, in fact a bruising and even violent struggle among elites was occurring with 
arrests, public fighting among elites in the media, and corresponding efforts to create 
and use new investigative organs to create the potential for an ongoing purge. (9)  As 
part of that struggle we see continuing rivalry between the older Procurator’s office and 
a new Investigations Committee (Sledstvennyi Komitet-SK) led by Putin’s law school 
classmate, Aleksandr Bastrykin, as well as continuing struggles over policy and control 
of resources.  As of 2007-08, analysis showed that,
"It is now fundamentally important for the Kremlin groupings to preserve their political 
assets, and they can only be augmented at the expense of rivals in the shadow 'vertical 
axis of power.'  One of the most viable methods for legitimating less than perfectly clean 
assets and illicit power is the legalization of the political status of the players – their 
presence in the Duma, the Federation Council, the government, and the future 
President’s staff.  Correspondingly, virtually the most effective way of fighting your rivals 
is to prevent them getting into legal politics.  Here control of the Investigations 
Committee, which will begin work on 1 September 2007 — will be very handy.  Even 
now membership of United Russia or Just Russia, or even the post of senator, governor, 
or mayor, is not a safeguard against criminal prosecution.  Given the intensification of 
the struggle among pro-regime groupings at a time when supreme power in the country 
is changing hands, it is perfectly logical from the viewpoint of the interests of the current 
business elites to give the Prosecutor’s office a political oversight role.  On the one 
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hand, this will make it possible to prevent, for example, a joint opposition candidate from 
participating in the presidential election, if such a candidate should eventually emerge.  
On the other, it will provide an opportunity to prevent rivals from other groupings from 
strengthening their position at the expense of the regions." (10)
This monster known as the SK can be used to purge enemies from their positions to 
clear space for members of a victorious grouping, just as occurred in 1937, if not even 
earlier, under Ivan the Terrible’s Oprichnina. As this commentary observed,
"Of course, the economic articles of the Criminal Code are not going to disappear from 
the political struggle.  And the process of redistributing assets or raw material resources 
among the 'victors' will continue nevertheless.  But the political articles both provide an 
opportunity to combat the non-establishment opposition (those who are not part of the 
Kremlin political pool) and also allow some sections of the system to fight others.  
Economic raids on behalf of the state with the assistance of, again, the Prosecutor’s 
Office have become one of the key elements of the Putin era.  It appears that we are 
now entering an era of political raiding when the owners of dubious assets and people 
with a weak position in the regime will be emerging from the shadows using legal 
political institutions and not allowing their rivals to do the same.  So the Investigations 
Committee will still play a role in Russia’s political history irrespective of which specific 
Kremlin groupings are behind its creation and what thrust they impart to this body’s 
work." (11)
Not surprisingly, once Medvedev and Gazprom triumphed over the siloviki faction, 
evidently led by Igor Sechin (who heads Rosneft), Gazprom moved to take over 
Rosneft’s prize subsidiary, Tomskneft. (12)  Soon afterwards it became clear that, as 
Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov warned, “destructive 
forces [are] attempting to drive a wedge” between Putin and Medvedev. (13)  Neither is 
it surprising that upon becoming president, Medvedev launched an anticorruption 
campaign.  While that campaign is unlikely to eliminate the corruption scourge from 
Russia, which still has not instituted the rule of law, nor held state officials accountable 
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to democratic processes, it almost certainly becomes a weapon for the replacement of 
officials deemed to be corrupt or those who could be so accused.   And since Medvedev 
announced what everyone already knew, namely that official positions are bought and 
sold, an anticorruption campaign strikes at many who built their careers in the Putin 
administration. (14) 
Naturally, Putin’s people have reason to be alarmed and see this as a threat to their 
position and power.  Consequently, Sechin (clearly supported by Putin) has led an 
attack on what Medvedev, who has extensive ties to Gazprom, calls “our 
Gazprom.” (15)  Similarly, Putin’s attack on the Mechel’ corporation, which led to a major 
perturbation in the Russian stock market, was then denounced by Medvedev, who 
cautioned officials against “giving nightmares” to business. While Putin clearly was 
calling for more state regulation of, and involvement in, the economy, Medvedev talked 
of lessening such intervention, but appears to be losing on that pledge, as the state now 
is likely to become even more involved in the economy. (16)
Putin, even before the Georgian campaign, also seemed to be trying to conduct his own 
security and foreign policy by planting hints among military men, who naturally support 
him, that Russia should restore its relations with Cuba and establish an air base there.  
He even sent Sechin and Security Council Chairman Nikolai Patrushev to Cuba to 
discuss the resumption of cooperation between the two states.  Given Patrushev’s 
position, this could only mean defense cooperation.  Such moves are clearly a 
gratuitous attempt to threaten the United States.  In any event, Cuban officials refused 
to cooperate – likely because these plans were announced publicly without first 
consulting them, providing further evidence that this move served interests other than 
that of Russian state policy. (17)
We cannot argue that Putin caused this war merely to retain his power and that of the 
siloviki.  The well-known geopolitical considerations that emerged before, during, and 
after combat operations cannot simply be called an appendage to the war.  However, it 
is clear that this crisis and war were planned well in advance and that the provocation of 
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Georgia probably was staged in such a way as to compel Medvedev, the sole person 
capable of legally authorizing force, to go beyond his initial support for peace 
enforcement cooperation confined solely to South Ossetia and to invade Georgia in 
order to remove South Ossetia and Abkhazia entirely from Tbilisi’s control. (18)  Once 
the war broke out, it was clear that Putin took the leadership position, until it became too 
obvious that he was usurping power.  But, few believe he has relinquished or lost power 
since the outbreak of hostilities.  In other words, domestic considerations of primacy and 
place were not likely to be far from the calculations of Putin and his entourage.
The foregoing analysis strongly suggests the need for further investigation not only of 
civil-military relations as an essential instrument of state building, but also of the link 
between succession crises and war in Russia.   The war with Georgia again has 
demonstrated to us just how critical these factors are for understanding Russian politics. 
But this war also tells us, in no uncertain terms, that the pathologies of this state, allied 
to a belief in its being under constant threat, coupled with its sense of being ascendant 
as the West declines, point in the direction of a long-term threat to Eurasian stability that 
it cannot control by itself.  Russia also will obviously resist any other government’s 
efforts to control it, but a state with an inherent predisposition to aggressive military 
action and an inherently illegitimate and unstable domestic political structure can only 
be seen as a risk factor, not as a true partner for any of its neighbors.  If the situation in 
Georgia teaches us anything, it is that a Russia, which has chosen self-isolation and 
autarchy at home and in the international arena represents a standing threat to all of its 
partners and neighbors.  Worse yet, in its present incarnation and given the tepid 
response of the West to the current crisis, not only is Russia a permanent risk factor, it 
is out of control and thinks it has a license for further adventures.
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